With President Donald Trump’s “pause” through July 9 on bespoke tariff rates now extended through the rest of the month, here’s a snapshot of where the administration’s tariff agenda currently stands.
Escalation with Canada, Mexico, and EU
In letters sent on July 10 and 11 to leaders in Canada, the European Union, and Mexico, the U.S.’s three largest trading partners, Trump threatened to escalate tariffs on products imported.
In his letter to Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Trump wrote that he would raise tariffs on Canadian products to 35% from the current 25% rate on imports deemed noncompliant with the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement. “Starting August 1, 2025, we will charge Canada a Tariff of 35% on Canadian products sent into the United States, separate from all Sectoral Tariffs,” Trump wrote. “Goods transshipped to evade this higher Tariff will be subject to that higher Tariff.”
The communication came as a surprise as leaders of both countries publicly expressed optimism in June that a new security and economic agreement could be achieved within 30 days.
In a response on social media, Carney said, “Throughout the current trade negotiations with the United States, the Canadian government has steadfastly defended our workers and businesses. We will continue to do so as we work towards the revised deadline of August 1.”
The Canadian prime minister added that Canada is committed to combating fentanyl shipments, Trump’s stated rationale for his tariffs on Canada, though only a small percentage of fentanyl seized in the U.S. has been traced to Canada.
Trump used similar rationale in his letter to Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, stating that “Mexico still has not stopped the Cartels who are trying to turn all of North America into a Narco-Trafficking Playground,” presenting that a negotiation around lowering tariffs would not be limited to trade issues.
Trump also raised “Non-Tariff, Policies, and Trade Barriers” in his letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, arguing that value-added taxes that the EU places on every product sold within the bloc should not be applied to U.S. imports.
In all three letters Trump established that the higher tariff rates would be separate from the already large product-specific tariffs on steel, aluminum, automobiles, and auto parts that are in place, coupled with the copper and other tariffs scheduled to go into effect later this year. Trump also threatened additional escalation for any retaliatory tariffs put into effect by those trade partners, stating that he would match any retaliatory rate and add the percentage he communicated in his July 10 and 11 letters on top of that.
Despite the threat, on July 14 the European Commissioner for Trade Maros Sefcovic said he was preparing a list of $84 billion worth of U.S. products to be targeted with retaliatory tariffs if the U.S. moves forward.
Grant Thornton Insight:
The broadness of grievances raised by the Trump administration, including the EU’s value-added tax and Mexico’s handling of drug cartels, could make it difficult to find political off-ramps that would avoid additional tariffs. However, it’s unclear how closely held those grievances are for the president versus if he wants to de-escalate over nonbinding agreements, as he has so far with China, the United Kingdom and Vietnam, while still maintaining the highest U.S. tariffs in decades.
New Aug. 1 deadline for ‘paused’ tariffs
Those last three threats represent (so far) the culmination of renewed tariff threats to major and minor trade partners made by the president thus far this month, as the July 9 ‘pause’ deadline passed with few new trade announcements.
In a July 7 executive order, Trump extended the July 9 deadline to Aug. 1 for tariffs on 14 different countries. In letters sent to those countries, as well as subsequent communication, he also outlined new tariff rates for U.S. importers to pay on products from each of the jurisdictions that do not agree to new terms with U.S. negotiators. In a statement on social media, Trump signaled that he would not delay the duties on imports into the U.S. from those countries any longer, posting that “all money will be due and payable starting AUGUST 1, 2025 — No extensions will be granted.” Trump briefly imposed tariffs on these countries — along with dozens of others — on April 9, only to pause them days later after negative market reactions.
In addition to the letters outlining new scheduled import tax rates for products not already covered by existing sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminum, automobiles and other items, decisions on treatment of Taiwan and India are pending, with indications of optimism around outlines that would lower the planned tariffs from the previously announced (and briefly imposed) rates from April. However, the situation remains extremely fluid. The administration has yet to announce any deals that would be legally binding under international trade law, though nonbinding agreements have been reached with the United Kingdom, Vietnam and China. Under those preliminary outlines or truces, most UK imports remain tariffed at 10%, most Vietnamese imports are tariffed at 20%, and Chinese imports have a 30% baseline rate (higher for many products) during a current de-escalatory truce scheduled to last until mid-August, although there’s always the possibility of an extension. Prior to the preliminary truce, Trump raised tariffs to a 145% baseline rate on Chinese imports, and commented that 55% could be the long-term tariff rate.
The administration remains committed to its current baseline tariff rate of 10% on all other imports from all other countries not specifically tagged with a higher rate. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent remarked publicly on July 8 that the administration plans to raise $300 billion in 2025 from tariffs, a figure suggesting not only that current tariffs would continue, but additional tariffs would fall into place and remain.
Listed below are new rates outlined by the Trump administration, per country (ordered roughly by trade volume with the U.S./population). This list is not comprehensive but aims to capture tariffs that would be most impactful to the U.S.
- Japan: 25%
- South Korea: 25%
- Brazil: 50%*
- Thailand: 36%
- Indonesia: 32%
- Switzerland: 31%
- Malaysia: 25%
- Philippines: 20%
- Israel: 17%
- Iraq: 30%
- South Africa: 30%*
- Cambodia: 36%
- Bangladesh: 35%
- Laos: 40%
- Myanmar: 40%
Aside from the complexity of country-by-country negotiations — for instance, Japan has legislative elections scheduled later this month, and South Korea experienced recent turnover in its government and, unlike most other countries, already has a formal free-trade agreement with the U.S. — the impact of tariffs on the U.S. economy adds to the fluidity of the situation. The governmental Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) recently revised its estimate of U.S. GDP decline in the first quarter of this year to -0.5%, a larger decrease in the economy than it originally estimated (-0.3%). This was down from a 2.4% annualized growth rate in Q4 2024. The BEA largely attributed the downturn to a temporary increase in imports as U.S. businesses stocked up in anticipation of tariffs; imports do not factor into GDP, and businesses may have shifted investment from other areas to increase inventory before prices increased.
On July 14 Trump also threatened “secondary” tariffs on Russia for continuing its reinvasion of Ukraine, saying in unplanned comments that he would implement 100% tariffs on imports from countries that trade with Russia; 500% on products from countries that buy Russian oil, natural gas, and uranium. Legislation to increase economic pressure on Russia to end its aggression against Ukraine is also picking up momentum in Congress.
Copper and pharmaceutical specific tariff threats
In remarks to the press during a White House cabinet meeting on July 8, Trump suggested that he would increase planned copper import tariffs from 25% to 50%. This would align copper tariffs with those on steel and aluminum, which were increased from 25% to 50% on June 4. The ad valorem import tax is imposed on not only the raw metals, but also components and derivative products.
Copper imports are already subject to an ongoing investigation by the administration, and Trump signaled a desire to accelerate the findings of that investigation to allow him to impose copper tariffs on Aug. 1, instead of in November, as previously expected. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, the law allowing copper and other product-specific tariffs, has mandatory timelines for investigations that may contradict Trump’s own desired schedule. However, these Section 232 tariffs could be on firmer ground against potential legal challenges than the country-specific tariffs, which were implemented under a novel use of a national security law (the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)).
Trump also floated a 200% tariff on pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical components — far higher than the expected 25% rate — though he suggested this would be imposed within the next 18 months, not as quickly as the rest of his tariff agenda. As with copper, the administration already has an ongoing Section 232 investigation into pharmaceutical imports, with a decision currently expected in December.
Grant Thornton Insight:
The impact of product-specific tariffs may currently be underappreciated. Because they apply to components of many products, the administration can maintain much of its global tariff agenda using Section 232 tariffs, regardless of what happens with legal challenges (see below) to the country-specific tariffs that have grabbed the majority of headlines.
Appeals processes move forward on the IEEPA tariffs
The appeals court argument dates have been set in two parallel appeals to rulings against the Trump administration’s IEEPA tariff regime.
The administration’s use of IEEPA, a law primarily used for sanctions but utilized for quick implementation of many of the tariffs imposed this year, was successfully challenged in May but allowed to stay in place pending appeal, with argument dates now set. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will hear arguments on July 31 in the administration’s appeal of a U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) summary judgment that, if upheld, would effectively upend much of the new country-by-country tariff regime. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has set its own Sept. 30 date to hear arguments in an appeal of a separate ruling that led to a narrower injunction on the administration’s tariff powers than the CIT decision, but one that could create precedent for other challenges.
Regardless of the appeals outcomes, the U.S. Supreme Court is expected to weigh in on the legality of the Trump tariffs at some point, possibly before the end of the year. In early June the court declined a request to consider the matter before the typical appeals process plays out.
If initial injunctions are upheld, it would end most of the Trump administration’s current tariffs on imports from China, Canada and Mexico; end or pre-empt the anticipated Aug. 1 tariffs; and lift the current 10% duty on most imports.
Businesses should closely monitor the upcoming Federal Circuit and D.C. Circuit appeals court decisions, as these rulings could fundamentally reshape or eliminate the Trump administration's country-specific tariff regime.
One Big Beautiful trade impact
The new law commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21), which contained a number of Trump administration priorities around taxes, eliminated the de minimis exception for shipments of $800 or less from tariffs and increased funding by $13 billion for Customs and Border Protection, the enforcement and guidance agency for tariffs.
Takeaways
The volume and rapid nature of the administration's trade actions, as well as possible retaliation and continued legal success against them, create uncertainty and make long-term decisions-making difficult. Businesses that respond by identifying multiple supply chain sources, instituting pricing flexibility where possible and monitoring closely new developments likely will stand the best chance of maintaining stability and exploiting opportunities when possible.
*On July 8 Trump threatened an additional 10% tariff rate for members of the BRICS coalition, which includes Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa, among other countries. The U.S. also launched a Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s proposed digital services tax on July 9.
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Kelly Schindler is the Head of the Manufacturing industry and an Audit Partner based in the Saint Louis office.
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Storme Sixeas serves as the Tax Legislative Affairs leader for Grant Thornton’s Washington National Tax Office.
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